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Abstract 
Given the significance of forecasting in real estate investment decisions, this paper 
investigates forecast uncertainty and disagreement in real estate market forecasts.  It 
compares the performance of real estate forecasters with non-real estate forecasters.  Using 
the Investment Property Forum (IPF) quarterly survey amongst UK independent real estate 
forecasters and a similar survey of macro-economic and capital market forecasters , these 
forecasts are compared with actual performance to assess a number of forecasting issues in 
the UK over 1999-2004, including forecast error, bias and consensus. The results suggest 
that both groups are biased, less volatile compared to market returns and inefficient 
in that forecast errors tend to persist.    The strongest finding is that forecasters display 
the characteristics associated with a consensus indicating herding. 
 
Keywords: Real estate forecasting, forecast accuracy, forecast disagreement, individual 
forecast, consensus.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For institutional real estate investors, expectations of future investment performance at the 
levels of individual real estate asset, sector, region, country and asset class are crucial to stock 
selection, and tactical and strategic asset allocation decisions. While all real estate forecasting 
is subject to some degree of uncertainty, a high degree of sophistication has been developed 
over recent years, with a range of advanced quantitative and qualitative procedures now used 
by institutional investors in real estate forecasting, including judgemental procedures, 
causal/econometric procedures and time series/trend analysis procedures (Higgins, 2000). 
This has seen numerous real estate forecasting studies in recent years concerning forecasting 
real estate rents, stock levels, returns, yields and cash flows; econometric and structural 
modelling, and comparisons of real estate forecasting procedures (see Newell et al, 2003). 
 
Given the centrality of forecasting to real estate investment decisions and performance, the 
focus in this paper is on uncertainty in forecasts of real estate rents and returns, and 
disagreement in expectations.  Uncertainty is an integral element of forecasts, and commercial 
real estate investors are constantly in the position of decision-making under uncertainty.  
“Forecasting competitions” suggest that the use of econometric modelling that dominates 
professional real estate forecasting can sometimes be of limited value.  Confirming many 
studies outside the real estate sector, real estate researchers have found, in many instances, 
simple forecasts (e.g. via naïve predictors) to be more accurate than using complex 
econometric models (Chaplin, 1999, 2000; Higgins, 2001; Wilson et al, 2000).  Further, in 
macro-economic forecasts, non-causal models often tend to dominate causal models (Hendry 
and Clements, 1999).  In most standard micro-economic models, market participants are 
assumed to share a common information set and to form similar expectations conditional 
upon that information.  However, there has been growing interest in the fact that market 
participants often disagree.  The topic of forecast disagreement (outside real estate) has 
generated a substantial body of research (see below) focussing on sources and causes of 
forecast disagreement and, interestingly, signals and information contained in forecast 
disagreement. 
This paper focuses on two dimensions of forecast uncertainty; namely, accuracy and 
disagreement.  Drawing upon a data set of professional forecasts of UK real estate market 
performance over 1999-2004, we investigate these real estate forecasts in terms of forecast 
error, bias and efficiency at both the consensus and individual forecaster level.  We examine 
the extent and nature of disagreement among professional real estate forecasters.  In order to 
investigate the comparative performance of UK real estate forecasters and to provide a 
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benchmark again which this performance can be evaluated, we also examine the forecasting 
performance of major UK investment banks and fund managers.  We compare the reliability 
of real estate forecasts with non-real estate analysts’ forecasts of a range of variables such as 
GDP, earnings growth and stock market performance. 
FORECAST FAILURE: UNCERTAINTY, ACCURACY AND RATIONALITY IN 
FORECASTS  
 
The discussion about the different dimensions of forecast uncertainty echoes much of the 
debate on appraisal uncertainty and smoothing (e.g: Webb, 1994; Clayton, Geltner and 
Hamilton, 2001).  The same distinctions are drawn between random variations between actual 
outcomes and predicted outcomes (error), and systematic tendencies towards optimism or 
pessimism (bias).  Similarly, the large body of research on forecast bias reproduces similar 
concepts found in research on appraisal-smoothing.    As in real estate, the term ‘forecast 
smoothing’ is used in the forecast literature to describe the tendency of forecasts to be less 
volatile than reality and to be display serial correlation. Clements (1995) identifies a tendency 
towards excessive smoothness in forecasts.  Nordhaus (1987) speculates that the lack of 
volatility in forecasts, relative to actual outcomes, is due to factors such as the need to reach a 
consensus and to maintain forecast credibility by avoiding major “jumps”.  In research that 
assessed the accuracy of real estate market forecasts in the UK over 1999-2002, Newell et al 
(2003) found empirical evidence of forecast inertia. Newell et al (2003) concluded that 
persistent over-estimation and under-estimation, manifested in serial correlation in forecast 
errors, suggested a smoothing effect in which significant new information is needed before 
major revisions to prior real estate forecasts are carried out.   
 
Forecast bias is closely linked to tests of efficiency and rationality in forecasts.  Rational 
expectations would imply forecasts are efficient in that they do not display predictable errors.  
Essentially, tests for forecast efficiency look for correlations between forecast errors and 
observable variables, the existence of which implies that forecast errors are predictable and 
therefore not rational.  Tests applied include identifying:   
 
• non-zero mean in forecast errors; 
 
• serial correlation in forecast errors; 
 
• significant correlation between forecast errors and a constant and the forecast itself; 
and 
 
• tests of correlation between forecast errors and a set of variables (assumed to be the 
information set). 
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Outside real estate, there is an extensive literature on the interlinked definition and causes of 
forecast failure.  If we define forecast failure in terms of simple ex post differences between 
forecasts and actual outcomesi, Hendry and Clements (2003) argue that it is rarely forecasting 
models that are the most important cause of forecast failure.   Although it may in some 
circumstances be attributable to factors such as inadequate theory and inaccurate 
observations, it mainly arises due to structural breaks in the patterns under study. As Hendry 
and Clement (2003, 303) state; “all econometric models are mis-specified, and all economies 
have been subject to unanticipated shifts”.  This produces a situation where model 
specification can be irrelevant to performance, in that correctly specified models can be 
outperformed by poorly specified models.  Consequently, from an ex ante perspective, 
Hendry and Clements (2003) make a distinction between measurable and un-measurable 
uncertainty.  The former is linked to the intrinsic error term inherent in econometric 
modellingii.  However, the error can provide a misleading indicator of actual forecast 
uncertainty, given the largely unknowable uncertainty caused by unanticipated shifts and 
shocks.   
 
Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001) provide a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence 
on forecast accuracy among financial analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share.  They identify 
a number of findings consistent with other studies. Analysts tend to outperform time series 
models; be optimistic and can be reluctant to provide unfavourable forecasts; to over-react to 
positive information and under-react to negative information.  They propose incentive 
structures and behaviourial biases as potential explanations of systematic optimism. As noted, 
Capstaff et al (2001) is just one example of the much cited bias of equity analysts in 
optimistic forecasting of the performance of companies which are clients.  Among macro-
economic forecasters, Laster et al (1999) found that in selecting forecast outcomes, 
forecasters are motivated not merely by forecast accuracy, but also by potential publicity for 
their firm.  Accordingly, where the rewards from the publicity attached to being accurate are 
relatively higher, forecasters are more likely to differentiate their views from the consensus, 
deliberately biasing their forecasts; a form of “rational” bias.  The balance between the 
attractions of publicity and a requirement for accuracy provides conflicting pressures for 
divergence and convergence (herding) forecasts.  In a discussion of how forecasters may be 
biased, Croushore (1997, 6) mentions “publicity effects” and suggests that: 
 
“some (survey) respondents might shade their forecasts more toward the consensus (to    
 avoid unfavourable publicity when wrong), whilst others might make unusually bold    
 forecasts to stand out from the crowd.” 
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Although there has been little published work on the accuracy of real estate forecasts, for the 
US Ling (2004) provides an interesting analysis of the forecasting ability of the sector and 
MSA rankings in the RERC survey.   Ling (2004) assesses whether the consensus opinions on 
market conditions contained in RERC’s survey results are useful in forecasting subsequent 
return performance.  He finds no evidence to support the view that analysts’ forecasts can 
improve performance and identifies no positive correlation between the prediction of the 
RERC survey respondents and actual return performance.  Intriguingly, he also finds that 
consensus predictions are correlated with NCREIF returns in the two years prior to the 
survey.  He therefore concludes that RERC’s investment conditions survey is clearly 
backward looking and not forward-looking.  Using a vivid metaphor, he describes using 
consensus opinions as akin to driving a car by looking in the rear view mirror.     
 
FORECAST DISAGREEMENT 
 
Bomberger (1996) examines disagreement and uncertainty in forecasts.  Disagreement is 
defined in terms of a measure of the ex ante dispersion of individual forecasts around the 
mean forecast, whereas uncertainty is defined in terms of the ex post dispersion of individual 
forecasts around the actual.  Whilst the two concepts are integrally related, a distinction is 
also drawn between individual and consensus uncertainty.  The uncertainty of an individual 
forecast is greater than the uncertainty of the mean forecast.  In an analysis of long-term 
inflation expectations, Bomberger (1996) finds that it is errors in the consensus forecasts 
rather than disagreement that are the dominant component of individual forecast uncertainty.  
However, it should also be noted that observed disagreement among forecasters may 
underestimate actual disagreement.  Supporting the forecast smoothing hypothesis, Gallimore 
and McAllister (2005) found that professional real estate forecasters in the UK often engage 
in “self-censorship” or are “censored” when models generate contentious or conspicuous 
forecasts.  This distrust of “big numbers” may be a rational bias, given the range of 
uncertainties about the inputs and the models; in addition to the reputational risks. 
 
In explaining forecast disagreement, Williams (2003) draws upon theories of rational 
heterogeneity of beliefs which assume that agents have at their disposal a range of forecasting 
models, but are uncertain as to which model or models to use.  Consequently, they adaptively 
update their model choice or priors over the various models based on forecasting 
performance.  In essence, it is argued that idiosyncratic differences in agents’ characteristics, 
(e.g. different initial conditions in model priors and costs to learning new models) implies that 
a range of models will be in use at any point in time.  Linden (2003, 5) expresses the point, 
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arguing that “forecasters have both different types and different amounts of information to 
form their beliefs”.   
 
Subjectivity is intrinsic to real estate forecast formation and will generate disagreement 
among real estate forecasters.  It has been recognised that differences in real estate forecasts 
occur due to differences in the structure of the econometric models, statistical procedures and 
data used (Mitchell and McNamara, 1997).  In the UK, Gallimore and McAllister (2005) 
argue that judgement is pervasive in the forecast formation process occurring in (econometric) 
model formation, due to variations in choice of causal variables, data selection and treatment, 
and constant and parameter specification.  Additionally, in a survey of professional 
forecasters, they found that the output of mechanical models is rarely the final forecast.  Pure 
model output is usually amended, as it is mediated and contested within organisations and 
forecasters themselves (who, as noted above, often have incentives to avoid conspicuous 
forecasts).  Similarly, in the US, Guilkey (1999) investigated the practice of US real estate 
market forecasters in terms of their parameters, methodology and output, and identified 
significant differences in the variables used, model specifications and the exogenous variables 
which are obtained from macro-economic forecast providers.  He found disagreement 
amongst forecasters, concluding that real estate forecasters “get to their conclusions using 
very different methodologies and obtain very different MSA rankings” (Guilkey, 1999, 40).   
 
There is also a body of work that tests for consensus in forecasts.  The standard definition of 
‘consensus’ is “an agreement of opinion”.  Where a statistical measure of consensus is being 
sought, measures of central tendency are typical.  However, a more sophisticated 
deconstruction of consensus can be identified in the literature.  Byrne and Lee (1999) argue 
that central tendency statistics do not robustly reflect the presence or absence of agreement.  
Following Schnader and Stekler (1979), they suggest that a consensus is present when 
forecasts are relatively close to each other and that no consensus exists if there is wide 
disagreement among the forecasts in a given cross-section.  Analysis of the distributional 
properties of forecasts is necessary to enable an assessment as to whether a consensus exists.  
Byrne and Lee (1999) adapt a sequential test from Schnader and Stekler (1991) which puts a 
check for normality as the key test for consensus.  However, even if normality is not present, 
it is argued that the lack of a consensus requires skewness (indicating a significant minority 
dissenting opinion).  If skewness is not present, then significant platykurtosis must be present 
(if a distribution is leptokurtic, then there is even more clustering around the mean than when 
the distribution is normal). 
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Previous analyses suggest that forecast disagreement may contain useful signals and 
information about market performance. Examining hypotheses generated by price-optimism 
models, Diether et al (2002) find that the bigger the disagreement in analysts’ forecasts of a 
stock’s returns, the lower its future returns.  Their central hypothesis is that optimistic buyers 
bias prices positively and cause future underperformance.  Focussing on inflation forecasts, 
Mankiw et al (2003) identified under-reaction to information when forming expectations 
about inflation.  They find that forecast disagreement rises with inflation and when inflation 
changes sharply.  They suggest that disagreement about future inflation moves together with 
other macro-economic variables raising “the possibility that disagreement may be a key to 
macro-economic dynamics”.  Bomberger (1996) finds that forecast disagreement can act as a 
proxy for forecast uncertainty, so that there is a positive relationship between the forecast 
errors and forecast disagreement at the time of the forecasts. Looking at individual 
forecasters, Cooper et al (1999) distinguished between lead or dominant forecasters and 
follower forecasters.  They argued that it was rational for less informed forecasters to delay 
publication of forecasts. Linden (2003) investigates patterns of asymmetries in forecast 
disagreement and their relationship with future performance.  In essence, it is argued that 
significant skewness in distributions of forecasts can signal upside and downside risk, 
depending on market conditions. 
 
In summary, this paper is concerned with assessing the nature and extent of the ex ante 
phenomenon of disagreement in real estate forecasts and assessing ex post the accuracy of 
consensus forecasts and the individual forecasts that comprise the consensus (if it is formally 
present).   There is ample evidence from the capital markets and macro-economic forecasts to 
argue that disagreement and error are intrinsic to forecasting. Overall, the more interesting 
questions relate to the quantity and pattern of disagreement and error in real estate forecasts 
and the signals in and consequences of these aspects of forecast uncertainty. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Real estate forecasts for the UK over 1999-2004 were obtained from the Investment Property 
Forum (IPF) Survey of Independent Forecasts: UK Property Investment (IPF, 2004), as well 
as individual forecasters’ values confidentially provided by the IPF. The IPF is a major real 
estate industry group in the UK and represents the interests of those involved in commercial 
real estate investment.  With over 1400 members, including investment surveyors, fund 
managers, academics, bankers, lawyers, actuaries and related professionals, the IPF’s 
objective is to enhance the knowledge, understanding and efficiency of real estate as an 
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investment by undertaking research and special projects, providing education for members, 
and encouraging discussion and debate amongst those concerned with real estate investment 
in the UK (see www.ipf.org.uk). 
 
The IPF real estate forecast surveys have been conducted since November 1998 and have 
been conducted quarterly (February, May, August and November) since 1999iii.  These IPF 
expert-opinion forecasting surveys collect information on future rental growth, capital 
growth and total returns from a range of UK real estate forecasters, including real estate 
advisors, fund managers and equity brokers.  These rental growth, capital growth and total 
return forecasts are presented at the “total” UK property level, with office, retail and 
industrial property sub-sector forecast results not available.   
 
Typically, 18-31 real estate forecasters participate in this quarterly survey, with an average of 
24 participants per IPF real estate forecasting survey over 1998-2004.  Details of the 
November 2004 IPF real estate forecasts survey, including participants, are shown in Exhibit 
1. The participants involved further reinforces the breadth of the UK real estate forecasting 
community that respond to this IPF survey. Building upon Newell et al (2003), this study 
analyses the individual forecasts that create the consensus forecasts.   
 
 Inevitably, the analysis of individual forecaster consistency is hindered by organisational 
and personnel changes over the study period.  Over 1998-2004, the IPF survey has seen new 
contributing organisations emerge, previous contributors leave (and sometimes re-emerge) 
and existing contributors merge with other existing contributors. This means that for a total 
of 46 contributors, there are only 10 who contributed for the full six years. There have also 
been changes in personnel within the various forecasting teams over this time period.   
 
EXHIBIT 1: IPF SURVEY OF INDEPENDENT FORECASTS : RESPONDENT 
PROFILE : NOVEMBER 2004 
 
Period of surveys: 1998-2004 
Frequency of survey : quarterly (typically February, May, August, November) 
Property parameters surveyed: rental growth, capital growth, total returns 
Number of participantsiv: 27 
• property advisors: 12 
• fund managers: 11 
• equity brokers: 4 
Participants: 
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• Property advisors: ATIS REAL Weatheralls, CB Richard Ellis, Cluttons, Colliers CRE, CVA 
Grimley, Cushman & Wakefield Healey & Baker, Knight Frank, Real Estate Forecasting, 
PMA, Experian Business Strategies, IPD, King Sturge 
• Funds managers: Arlington Property Investors, Deutsche Asset Management, Henderson 
Global Investors, LaSalle Investment Management, Legal and General Investment 
Management, Prudential Property Investment Managers, Standard Life Investments, Cordea 
Savills, ING Real Estate Investment Management, Invesco, Scottish Widows Investment 
• Equity brokers: Merrill Lynch, UBS, Morgan Stanley 
 
 
Previous US real estate forecasting studies (e.g. Guilkey, 1999) have indicated that this type 
of real estate forecasting data is not readily available for the US. Similarly, some US survey-
based real estate forecasts (eg: IRRs, cap rates, yields) are available from the Korpacz Real 
Estate Investment Survey (see www.pwcreval.com) and the Real Estate Research 
Corporation (see www.rerc.com).  Grissom and DeLisle (1998) provide details of the 
Korpacz and Real Estate Corporation forecasting surveys. However, neither of these US 
forecasting surveys provide the necessary depth nor time series structure of forecasts 
comparable to the UK IPF real estate forecasting surveys. As such, no equivalent consensus 
expert-opinion real estate forecast surveys are available in the other mature real estate 
markets, such as the US or Australia. Hence this IPF survey represents a unique real estate 
forecasting service and expert-opinion real estate forecasting database. 
 
In each IPF survey, participants are asked to forecast real estate performance (rental growth, 
capital growth and total returns) to the end of the current year, as well as forecast these real 
estate performance measures to the end of the year for the next two years. The ‘target’ is the 
IPD All Property Index.  This sees real estate forecasts presented for up to thirty months 
ahead.  With these IPF surveys conducted quarterly, this sees subsequent real estate forecasts 
presented for forecast lead times of 30M, 27M, 24M, …, 6M, 3M, 0M; thus allowing the 
assessment of the accuracy of real estate forecasting as the time difference between the real 
estate forecast and the actual real estate performance reduces on a quarterly basis from thirty 
months to zero months.  
 
The IPF UK real estate forecasts were then compared with the respective Investment Property 
Databank (IPD) actual UK annual real estate returns (IPD, 2005a).  The IPD real estate 
indices represent the commercial real estate performance benchmarks for the UK. The IPD 
annual database is the most reliable benchmark of direct real estate performance in the UK. It 
comprises approximately 11,000 properties with a total value of over £121 billion at 
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December 2004 (see Exhibit 2: Panel A), equivalent to 45% of the total real estate assets of 
UK investing institutions and listed real estate companies.  Full details of the IPD UK real 
estate indices are available from www.ipdindex.co.uk. 
 
EXHIBIT 2: IPD UK PROPERTY INDEX PORTFOLIOS: DECEMBER  2004 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A: Annual index 
Property   Number of          Value of portfolio  Percentage of 
portfolio component properties     portfolio value 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Office       2,947      £33.3 billion   27.6% 
Retail       4,359      £64.4 billion   53.3% 
Industrial      2,966      £19.3 billion    16.0% 
Other           714                    £3.8 billion     3.1% 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Total                 10,986                 £120.8 billion   100.0%  
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Monthly index 
Property   Number of       Value of portfolio  Percentage of 
portfolio component properties     portfolio value 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Office           736       £6.3 billion   23.6% 
Retail         1,465                           £15.5 billion   58.1% 
Industrial                      756       £4.4 billion                           16.5% 
Other            143                              £0.5 billion     1.8% 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Total                    3,100                 £26.7 billion   100.0% 
Source: IPD (2005a, b)  
 
An interesting feature of the forecasting problem is that the forecasters are forecasting rental 
and capital growth and total return at a given number of points during that year.  As the year 
progresses, it would be expected that forecasting accuracy increases as the target end-of-year 
date becomes closer.  Additionally, real estate forecasters for the IPD Annual Index are 
informed by the IPD Monthly Indexv (IPD, 2005b).  Although drawing from a different 
sample of properties (see Exhibit 2: panel B), this monthly index provides a monthly update 
on performance as the year progresses.  For example, the IPF August survey forecast is a 
forecast for the next five months, with the forecaster able to draw upon the recorded IPD 
monthly returns to June/July.  In effect, the forecasters are receiving regular signals about 
actual market returns that should enable them to update their real estate forecasts.  These 
 12
implied forecasts also provide us with some insights about the efficiency of real estate 
forecasters in reacting to new information.  
 
Legal and General Investment Management have also kindly provided us with forecasts for a 
range of capital market and macro-economic variables for a range of investment 
organisations.  Full details of the organisations and the variables are provided below.   
 
− ABN Amro 
− Barclays 
− Chase 
− Citigroup Smith Barney 
− CSFB 
− Deutsche Bank 
− Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein 
− Goldman Sachs 
− HSBC Securities 
− JP Morgan 
− L&G Inv Mgt 
− Merrill Lynch 
− Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 
− Schroder SSB 
− UBS Warburg 
 
Similar to the IPF survey, these data typically consist of forecasts (which are usually updated 
quarterly) for a range of variables at calendar year end.  The variables discussed here are GDP 
growth and CPI change in calendar year; dividend and earnings growth in calendar year and 
the percentage change in the FTSE index.  In terms of timing, the key difference from the real 
estate forecasts is that the projections are produced on a more typical quarterly basis.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Overall, the project has a large number of individual forecasts for an array of non-real estate 
variables for the last six years.  This presents a large number of options for analysing the data.  
In this paper we focus on a small number of aspects.  However, a crucial issue to bear in mind 
when considering the observed patterns is that the macro-economic forecasts may form inputs 
in both the real estate and capital market forecasting models.  For instance, common macro-
economic assumptions may be independent variables in both the dividend/earnings growth 
forecasting models and the rental growth forecasting models.  
 
Forecast Disagreement 
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In Exhibits 3 and 4, we present a summary of the one-year ahead forecasts for change (%) in 
real estate  rental and capital growth and total returns and non-real estate variablesvi. In each 
case, it is only based on the first forecast in the end-of-year returns; consideration of 
subsequent quarterly updated forecasts (at May, August and November) are not assessed in 
this section.  
 
Forecast disagreement is indicated by the range between the maximum and minimum 
forecasts and the standard deviation of forecasts.  Similarities are a prevailing theme. The 
median and the mean forecast tend to be similar, providing a preliminary indication of 
normality in the distribution of forecasts.  The range between maximum and minimum for 
forecasts tend to remain relatively constant over the period.  Additionally, the standard 
deviation of forecasts remains relatively stable from year to year.  This suggests that the level 
of disagreement among forecasters is relatively stable for one year-ahead forecasts.  Although 
the ranges appear large, it is apparent that around three quarters of the forecasts for total 
return are typically within 1.5% of the mean. 
 
Further, the evidence of a consensus among real estate forecasters is strong.  In all but one 
case, the annual distribution of the forecasts is normal for all forecasts.  The only clear-cut 
exception is the rental growth forecast for 2002, when the distribution is significantly non-
normal and there is significant negative skewness in the forecast for rental growth.  This may 
reflect negative sentiment following the perceived increase in downside risks following 9/11 
in 2001.  Likewise, the forecasts for 1999 display similar characteristics.  The rejection of 
non-normality is marginal and there is significant negative skewness.  Again, this may reflect 
increased negative sentiment following the perceived growth in downside risks following the 
financial market turmoil in the second half of 1998 associated with the Russian debt crisis and 
the collapse of Long Term Capital Management.  However, these factors only feature in rental 
growth forecasts and strong evidence of consensus remains about total returns and capital 
growth in both 1999 and 2002. 
 
We find similar remarkably similar patterns for non-real estate forecasters.  In Exhibit 4 we 
present the descriptive statistics for projections of dividend and earnings annual growth and 
FTSE annual change.  Whilst the sample size may indicate small sample problems, at first 
sight it is clear that there is strong evidence of consensus amongst non-real estate forecasters.   
For both earnings (2003) and dividend growth (2000), there is only one year when the 
distribution of forecasts is non-normal.  These similarities generate two possibilities.  Firstly 
it may suggest that the tendency of forecasters to herd is not purely a real estate phenomenon  
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EXHIBIT 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR IPF FORECASTS: 1999 - 2004 
       
RENTAL GROWTH FORECAST (% p.a.)    
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
       
 Mean 3.26 4.86 4.65 0.18 -0.88 -0.27 
 Median 4.00 5.00 4.65 0.55 -0.70 -0.10 
 Maximum 7.10 7.50 7.10 2.10 1.40 1.00 
 Minimum -2.00 2.00 2.70 -4.00 -3.00 -2.00 
 Range 9.10 4.50 4.40 6.10 4.40 3.00 
 Std. Dev. 2.32 1.31 1.34 1.36 1.25 0.86 
 Skewness -0.99 -0.18 0.12 -1.40 -0.10 -0.31 
 Kurtosis 3.35 2.44 1.83 4.94 2.49 2.47 
       
 Jarque-Bera 4.39 0.58 1.48 11.59 0.21 0.70 
 Probability 0.11 0.75 0.48 0.00 0.90 0.70 
       
 Observations 26 31 25 24 17 25 
       
CAPITAL GROWTH FORECAST (% p.a.)    
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
       
 Mean 2.21 5.68 3.19 0.40 -0.78 1.04 
 Median 2.50 5.70 3.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
 Maximum 7.00 10.00 6.60 2.70 1.80 4.00 
 Minimum -4.00 3.00 1.00 -3.00 -3.20 -2.00 
 Range 11.00 7.00 5.60 5.70 5.00 6.00 
 Std. Dev. 2.56 1.62 1.22 1.38 1.46 1.37 
 Skewness -0.59 0.35 0.55 -0.63 -0.44 0.01 
 Kurtosis 3.04 3.06 3.92 3.22 2.13 2.73 
       
 Jarque-Bera 1.53 0.65 2.16 1.63 1.20 0.07 
 Probability 0.47 0.72 0.34 0.44 0.55 0.96 
       
 Observations 26 31 25 24 19 25 
       
TOTAL RETURN FORECAST (% p.a.)  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
       
 Mean 9.40 12.78 10.38 7.31 6.07 7.97 
 Median 10.00 13.00 10.00 7.40 6.25 8.00 
 Maximum 15.00 17.00 14.90 9.20 8.30 10.10 
 Minimum 3.00 10.00 6.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 
 Range  12.00 7.00 8.90 4.20 5.30 5.10 
 Std. Dev. 2.62 1.61 1.91 1.22 1.45 1.26 
 Skewness -0.46 0.45 0.32 -0.14 -0.54 -0.43 
 Kurtosis 3.29 3.30 3.65 2.33 2.42 2.67 
       
 Jarque-Bera 1.00 1.14 0.87 0.55 1.12 0.89 
 Probability 0.61 0.57 0.65 0.76 0.57 0.64 
       
 Observations 26 31 25 25 18 25 
       
EXHIBIT 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LGIM FORECASTS: 1999 - 2004 
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DIVIDEND GROWTH FORECASTS (% p.a.)    
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
       
 Mean 5.33 7.05 6.42 4.36 2.64 6.12 
 Median 5.00 7.00 7.00 4.00 2.65 6.00 
 Maximum 8.00 14.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 10.00 
 Minimum 4.00 4.00 4.00 -2.00 0.00 4.00 
 Std. Dev. 1.50 2.71 1.24 2.73 1.54 1.92 
 Skewness 0.93 1.52 -0.55 -0.86 0.59 0.76 
 Kurtosis 2.40 5.09 2.32 3.92 3.89 2.86 
       
 Jarque-Bera 1.91 6.22 0.83 1.75 0.92 0.88 
 Probability 0.38 0.04 0.66 0.42 0.63 0.64 
       
 Observations 12 11 12 11 10 9 
       
FTSE CHANGE FORECASTS (% p.a.)    
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
       
 Mean n/a n/a 12.95 11.56 19.67 5.63 
 Median n/a n/a 13.29 11.18 15.48 5.00 
 Maximum n/a n/a 22.13 18.84 39.59 11.71 
 Minimum n/a n/a 6.06 3.51 6.60 0.54 
 Std. Dev. n/a n/a 5.04 5.15 12.38 4.58 
 Skewness n/a n/a 0.04 -0.01 0.70 0.15 
 Kurtosis n/a n/a 2.12 1.90 2.04 1.59 
       
 Jarque-Bera n/a n/a 0.39 0.56 1.21 0.78 
       
 Probability n/a n/a 0.82 0.76 0.55 0.68 
 Observations n/a n/a 12 11 10 9 
       
EARNINGS GROWTH (% p.a.)    
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
       
 Mean 5.18 9.64 7.73 2.39 10.79 8.39 
 Median 5.00 9.00 8.16 3.00 9.50 8.00 
 Maximum 8.50 15.00 12.00 8.40 23.00 13.00 
 Minimum 1.70 5.00 1.20 -7.00 6.00 5.00 
 Std. Dev. 2.15 2.84 3.03 4.75 4.93 2.69 
 Skewness -0.18 0.36 -0.60 -0.56 1.60 0.76 
 Kurtosis 1.96 2.56 2.81 2.44 4.83 2.43 
       
 Jarque-Bera 0.61 0.32 0.73 0.71 5.68 0.99 
 Probability 0.74 0.85 0.69 0.70 0.06 0.61 
       
 Observations 12 11 12 11 10 9 
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but is typical of wider economic forecasting sector.  Alternatively since real estate forecasters 
typically use macro-economic forecasts, they may be maintaining their consensus attributes in 
real estate forecasts. 
 
Comparative Forecast Accuracy 
 
As discussed above, there are many dimensions to evaluating forecast accuracy.  The topic of 
the measurement of forecast accuracy has itself generated substantial debate (see Fildes and 
Stekler, 1999 for a detailed review).  In this paper we apply a range of common error metric 
measures – mean error and mean absolute errors to the data.   We also provide some 
qualitative analysis of the timing ability of forecasters. However, the debate on forecast 
evaluation has highlighted that error metric measures do not control for a number of issues to 
ensure that fair comparisons are being made.  Scale may be significant. Variables measured in 
large units (e.g. capital growth) will almost inevitably have large differences in terms of error 
metrics compared to more stable variables (e.g. GDP change).  The volatility of the variable 
will affect the ‘degree of difficulty’ of forecasting.  Variables which tend to display high 
levels of serial correlation (e.g. CPI change, rental growth) will tend to be easier to forecast 
than variables that move in a random pattern (e.g. stock prices and bond yields).  Typically, 
differences in variability are controlled for by incorporating information on the observed 
change in the predicted variable.  
 
We also compare the performance of forecasters against a naïve time series model (same 
change as last year). Theil’s U-statistic is used.  The naïve forecasting methods used in 
calculating Theil’s U-statistic in this study were the “same change” forecasting strategy, in 
which the previous actual annual return is used as the real estate forecast for the subsequent 
annual period. In particular, in interpreting Theil’s U-statistic: 
 
• U=1 indicates the naïve forecasting method is as good as the forecasting technique 
being evaluated 
 
• U<1 indicates the forecasting technique being evaluated is better than the naïve 
forecasting method 
 
• U>1 indicates the forecasting technique being evaluated is worse than the naïve 
forecasting method. 
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Real Estate v Non-Real Estate Forecasters 
 
 
Firstly, we focus on the simple differences between forecasts and actual outcomes.  Focusing 
initially at a basic level, Exhibit 5 presents the results of the actual change in FTSE with the 
consensus predicted change in FTSE for the period 2001-2004.   
 
Exhibit 5 
 
 
Consensus Forecast Error
FTSE - Actual and Predicted
-30.00
-20.00
-10.00
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
2001 2002 2003 2004
%
 g
ro
w
th Actual
Predicted
 
 
Exhibit 6 
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At first sight, the results (admittedly from only four observations) suggest that the 
performance of equity market forecasters is poor.  In 2001 and 2002, the consensus forecasts 
had large absolute errors and failed to forecast the correct direction of the market.  Indeed, it 
reinforces the apparent herding effect.  No individual forecaster predicted a fall in the index in 
2001 and 2002.    Alternatively, equity markets may be extremely difficult to forecast and we 
need to control for both the variability and randomness of the return patterns.  This point is 
clear when we look at Exhibit 6.  Without allowing for differences in scale in the Y axis, we 
see straightaway that the forecasting record for CPI is much better. Perhaps a fairer 
comparison is between the consensus predictions for the income components of total return.  
 
Exhibit 6 displays the simple mean error for quarterly1 forecasts for end-of-calendar year 
growth in rental values and dividends.  Although 2001 stands out as a period when equity 
market analysts persistently overestimated dividend growth, the similarities in both series are 
striking.  If we exclude this year, the mean quarterly error is for dividend growth is (0.4%) 
and for rental growth it is (0.2%).  Much more striking is the serial correlation in the errors 
(dividend growth: 0.73, rental growth: 0.62).  This suggests that both groups of forecasters 
display notable sluggish in adjusting their forecasts.  
 
Exhibit 7  
 
 
 
Our final comparative analysis is Theil U-statistic.  As noted above, this is a common 
approach to standardise different types of forecasts for evaluation.  The results are displayed 
                                                 
1 N.B Dates of the quarterly real estate and non real estate forecasts are different.  
Comparative Forecast Errors
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-4.0 
-2.0 
0.0 
2.0 
4.0 
6.0 
8.0 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
% error 
Dividend growth
Rental growth 
 19
in Exhibit 8.   We calculate the Theil U- statistic for each individual forecaster and then 
provide the average for each individual year.   
 
Exhibit 9 
  
 Mean Theil U-statistic   
      
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
      
Rental Growth 1.68 0.40 0.35 1.64 0.66 
Capital Growth 0.58 0.89 0.84 3.61 1.38 
Total Return 0.56 0.99 0.79 3.86 1.40 
      
CPI Change 1.09 1.08 1.45 0.93 0.59 
GDP Growth 0.21 0.43 0.37 0.50 0.25 
Dividend growth 1.20 4.30 1.47 0.84 1.20 
Earnings Growth 1.19 1.63 2.28 0.46 3.00 
Base rates 0.68 3.46 1.30 0.50 0.67 
FTSE growth  4.84 6.18 1.76 0.65 
      
 
 
It is apparent that not only are there large differences between the variables but there are also 
large differences among the annual figures.  It is significant that it is only for GDP that there 
is clear-cut evidence that forecasters outperform the naïve forecast.    From this preliminary 
analysis, it is difficult to make a convincing case that forecasters add value.  We now go on to 
examine whether any individual real estate forecasters stand out from the group. 
 
Real Estate Forecasters v Real Estate Forecasters 
 
In this section we compare the forecasting performance of individual real estate forecasters 
with each other. To assess the performance of individual forecasters, individual absolute 
differences for total returns were assessed for one year ahead forecasts for each year over 
1999-2004. Overall, 18-31 real estate forecasters participated each year, representing 
organisations in the areas of real estate advisors (7-10 per year), fund managers (8-13 per 
year) and equity brokers (3-8 per year). While 46 organisations participated over this six year 
period, only 10 organisations provided forecasts each year. 
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Amongst the three groups of forecasters over 1999-2004, real estate advisors were seen to be 
the most accurate group of forecasters, followed by fund managers and equity brokers. This 
was the same order based on  
 
i. all organisations per year,  
ii. organisations participating in at least four of six years and 
iii. organisations participating in all six years.  
 
However, there were instances over this six year period where each of these groups was the 
best performed group, but also the worst performed groups; namely: 
   
• best performed: real estate advisors (2/6),fund managers (3/6), equity brokers (1/6) 
• worst performed: real estate advisors (3/6),fund managers (1/6),equity brokers (2/6); 
 
This further reinforces the point that no single group of real estate forecasters outperforms the 
other two groups on a consistent basis. 
 
In assessing the individual forecasting organisations, the objective was to assess whether 
some organisations were consistently amongst the top performers in forecasting ability. As 
such, within each year, the real estate forecasters were ranked and then assigned to quartiles. 
Exhibit 5 gives the details for those forecasters who participated in at least four of the last six 
years. 
 
A number of points emerge from this individual forecaster analysis.  Overall, these individual 
forecaster results confirm the lack of consistent performance by individual real estate 
forecasters over the period of 1999-2004.  There is little indication to support the view that 
any individual forecaster is able to ‘win’ on a consistent basis. No forecaster was in the top 
quartile in all six years.  The best was for two out of the six years.  For those forecasters 
participating in at least four of the six years, the best performance in the top quartile was 75% 
of years (see PA9), with only three forecasters in the top quartile in at least 50% of the years ( 
see PA1, PA9, FM9).  Significantly, the best performers were also often amongst the worst 
performers in other years, being in the bottom quartile for up to 50% of the years (see FM9, 
EB1).   
 
There is some preliminary evidence that some forecasters may ‘lose’ with some consistency.  
Some forecasters were in the bottom quartile in 50% of the years ( see FM10, EB1, EB3), 
with 7 of the 22 forecasters being in the bottom quartile on at least 33% of occasions.  We 
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need to examine whether this represents a statistically significant underperformance. In 
specific years, the “best” individual forecaster was a real estate advisor(4 of the 6 years), fund 
manager(1/6) and equity broker(1/6).  However, the “best” individual forecasters were 
generally unable to repeat the performance in other years; for example, most successful were 
two of the “1sts” also getting “3rd best” in one subsequent year.  Only six forecasters managed 
to get in the “top 3” in two years; no forecasters were able to do this in more than two of the 
six years.  Over the full six years, three of the “best” individual forecasters were real estate 
advisors( #1, #3, #4);the other being a fund manager(#2);the best by an equity broker was #6.   
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Exhibit 5:  Individual real estate forecaster quartile performance 
 
Property             1999      2000      2001      2002       2003      2004      1999-2004 
Forecaster 
 
PA1                     1             2            *           1              1           2                 1 
PA2                     3             2            3           1              *           *                 1 
PA3                     1             3            1           2              3           3                 2 
PA4                     1             4            3           3              1           2                 3 
PA5                     1             2            2           4              2           4                 3 
PA6                     3             2            2           1              *           4                 2 
PA7                     *             1            4           1              2           3                 3 
PA8                     *             4            1           3              1           2                 2 
PA9                     *             *            1           2              1           1                 1 
  
FM1                    3             2            3           3              1           2                 4 
FM2                    3             3            4           3              *           1                 3 
FM3                    4             2            3           2              1           4                 4 
FM4                    3             4            3           2              1           3                 3 
FM5                    2             2            4           3              2           1                 2 
FM6                    1             3            2           3              *           *                 1 
FM7                    4             1            1           2              2           4                 3 
FM8                    3             2            1           2              3           2                 2 
FM9                    *             1            1           4              4           1                 1 
FM10                  *             3            4           4              *           1                 4 
 
EB1                    4              4            2           1              4           1                 4 
EB2                    *              1            2           4              3           2                 1 
EB3                    *              2            4           3              *           4                 4 
 
Note: 
(1): 1=1st quartile, 2=2nd quartile, 3=3rd quartile, 4=4th quartile 
(2): * =did not participate in specific year 
(3): quartile performance for 1999-2004 is  based  on average absolute difference over respective years in which forecaster 
participated 
(4): quartile performance for 1999-2004 is assessed on those forecasters participating  in at least four of the six years   
 
 
 
 
 23
Real Estate Sub-groups - Ranking Performance 
 
In this section we present the results of ranking the three groups of forecasters namely, 
property advisors, fund managers and equity brokers, together with a combined group. The 
rankings are in respect of consensus forecasts, being the average for each group fover the five 
year period 1999-2004 inclusive. The performance statistics are calculated for forecasts made 
over the longest period for each of the years 1999-2004.  
 
The forecast error measures reported are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rental growth: Rankings based on average over the period 1999-2004 
Forecaster RMSE MAE MAPE Theil’s Inequality 
PA 2 2 4 2 
FM 3 3 3 3 
EB 4 4 2 4 
ALL 1 1 1 1  
 
 
The ranking show that the combined group comprising of all forecasters produces, on 
average, the lowest forecast errors.  This is a well documented result. For rental growth, 
property advisors appear to have produced the lowest forecast errors, followed by fund 
managers and lastly equity brokers.  
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Capital Growth: Rankings based on average over the period 1999-2004 
Forecaster RMSE MAE MAPE Theil’s Inequality 
PA 2 4 4 3* 
FM 4 3 3 3* 
EB 3 2 2 2 
ALL 1 1 1 1 
* = same ranking 
 
Once gain, the composite of all forecasts results in the lowest forecast errors. Over the period, 
there were variations for in ranking for individual years. Depending on the selected measure 
any of the groups would rank highest. The overall picture appears to be that equity brokers are 
ranked the highest followed by fund mangers. These rankings suggest that the forecasting 
skills for rental growth displayed by property advisors, as a group, do not necessarily carry 
over into capital growth forecasts where equity brokers may have had the edge. 
 
 
Total Return: Rankings based on average over the period 1999-2004 
Forecaster RMSE MAE MAPE Theil’s Inequality 
PA 3* 4 4 2* 
FM 3* 3 3 2* 
EB 2 2 2 2* 
ALL 1 1 1 1 
* = same ranking 
 
Once gain, the combined group results in the highest ranking. The ranking pattern for total 
returns is repeated with equity brokers, as a group, being the most highly ranked. This suggest 
some consistency in the forecasts in that accurate capital growth forecasts carry over into total 
returns. 
 
The results represent consensus forecasts and ongoing analysis is looking at the ranking of 
individual forecasters within these groups for individual years. 
 
Testing for bias in the consensus forecasts 
 
We examined whether the consensus forecasts were unbiased forecasts. On average, 
an unbiased forecast would fall very close to the actual outcome. A simple linear 
regression often used to test for bias in the forecast series is estimated for each 
category of forecaster. The word ‘bias’ is used in a statistical sense where there may 
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be a tendency to consistently under or over-estimate a value, such as, for example 
rental growth. The regression equation takes the form: 
 
ttt FA εββ ++= 10   
 
Where, At is actual value and Ft is the forecast value in some previous period. Unless 
10 10 == ββ and , the value of At predicted by the equation will differ from the forecast 
value Ft. A choice needs to be made about the appropriate number of observations to use in 
the regression. Too few observations will reduce the number of degrees of freedom whereas 
too large a sample is likely to include older observations that may reflect biases that are 
different from more recent experience. As previously mentioned, the sample size we work 
  Consistency tests: B0=0 and B1=1   
    Rental Growth Capital Growth Total Return 
1999 PA No Yes*/No Yes*/No 
  FM No No Yes*/No 
  EB No No No 
  ALL Yes*/No No No 
          
2000 PA No No Yes*/No 
  FM No No No 
  EB No No Yes 
  ALL No Yes*/No Yes*/No 
          
2001 PA Yes Yes Yes 
  FM Yes Yes Yes 
  EB No Yes Yes 
  ALL Yes*/No Yes Yes 
          
2002 PA Yes Yes Yes*/No 
  FM No Yes Yes*/No 
  EB No No Yes 
  ALL No Yes Yes 
          
2003 PA Yes No No 
  FM Yes No No 
  EB Yes No No 
  ALL Yes No No 
          
2004 PA No No No 
  FM No No No 
  EB No No No 
  ALL No No No 
 Note: * Passes F-test but not Chi-squared  
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with here are the run of forecasts for IPD end-of-year values., which range from sample sizes 
of 4 forecast observations to 12 forecast observations for each end year  1999 to 2004. The 
following tables summarize the results for a joint test of the null 10 10 == ββ and . 
 
The results are mixed. For example, most of the forecasts for 2001 were largely unbiased. 
Rental forecasts for  2003 were unbiased whereas capital growth and total returns forecasts 
were not. All of the forecasts for 2004 were biased. Clearly, there are times when property 
forecasters are able to efficiently take information on board and reflect this in forecasts and on 
other occasions this is not the case. This requires further investigation in order to understand 
under what conditions property forecasters are able to provide unbiased forecasts. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The results presented in this paper represent initial work in looking at the forecast history of  
the UK real estate market based on the IPF data. The data set is relatively short, especially 
when compared with the long histories of forecasts in macro–economic variables. The 
number of contributors to the IPF survey is a small unbalanced panel. However, not-with-
standing the relative limitations of the data set, it possible to obtain insights into the track 
record of the forecasts.   
 
At the consensus level no one group of forecasters produces the most accurate forecasts 
across all three forecast property categories. Furthermore, there is some evidence that  
forecasts are biased in different periods. 
 
Ongoing work is addressing the following questions: the internal consistency of forecasts 
across the three forecast categories, that is, are total return forecasts consistent with the rental 
and capital growth forecasts?; are forecast revisions consistent with macro-economic data and 
revisions in forecasts of macro-economic variables such as GDP, employment and interest 
rates. For individual forecasters a panel-based approach will analyse changes on an individual 
level, that is, why do the forecasts behave differently? 
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i Evidence from UK real estate forecasters suggests that they would regard such a measure as a crude 
indicator of forecast success.  Gallimore and McAllister (2005) find that most real estate forecasters 
regarded identifying the relative rather than absolute performance as the best indicator of success. 
Reflecting the preferences of many UK real estate forecasters, Granger and Pesaran (1999, 538) 
advocate a decision theoretical approach to forecast evaluation where there is a “consideration of the 
linkage between the modeler who produces forecasts and the decision maker who consumes them” in 
order to compare the relative usefulness of forecasts.   
ii As a result there is growing interest in communicating results in terms of probability density 
functions.  
iii No survey was conducted in February 1999. 
iv Some survey respondents are unnamed for confidentiality reasons. 
v There are typically minor differences in performance between the two indices.  The monthly index 
consists of funds appraised on a monthly basis which are typically unitised funds.  The lot size tends to 
be smaller in such funds so that certain sectors do not have as large weights e.g. shopping centres, 
London offices.  
vi The 1999 forecast is based upon the November 1998 survey.  The greater disagreement in this year 
may reflect the fact that the forecast is earlier. 
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